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Summary 
 
This paper discusses the main trends in economic growth in Belarus. It argues that 
the sustainability of several growth factors is in question over the mid-term. There are 
exogenous risks (decrease of commodities prices, Russian trade policy, and decrease 
or elimination of Russian energy subsidies to Belarus) and endogenous risks (income 
policy of the government and rigidity of its policy towards privatization). In order to 
reduce the risks for growth sustainability the government plans to implement several 
measures, in particular to balance its income policy by reducing the gap between 
labor productivity and real wage growth. But in order to ensure growth sustainability 
several additional steps will need to be taken. First, in order to improve the 
investment climate it is necessary to draw up a limited list of enterprises not subject 
to privatization and to allow foreign investors to buy the controlling shares of any 
company not on this list. Second, in order to attract capital into state enterprises, the 
government should soften the ‘golden share’ institute, i.e. it should limit the number 
of cases to which it will be applied to a clearly and unambiguously defined list, or – 
better yet – to eliminate this procedure altogether. Finally, it is necessary to make it 
easier to do business in Belarus. All these measures could contribute to transform the 
current short-term economic growth into long-term sustainable growth, which will 
increase the welfare of the Belarusian people. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years Belarus showed quite fast economic growth: The GDP growth rate was 
7% in 2003 and 11% in 2004, and the government has projected significant growth for 
the next 6 years (about 8% per annum). In this paper we are developing proposals to 
support this ambitious goal for economic growth, which the government has set. Our 
main question is how to convert the current rate of economic growth into long-term 
sustainable growth. In order to answer this question it is necessary to identify the main 
sources of the current economic growth and the growth determinants deriving from 
government policies and programs. This will then allow us to identify the major threats 
to sustained growth, and to propose suitable recommendations to overcome these 
threats. 
The paper is organized as following. In the next part the main causes for the recent 
economic growth (from both the demand and the supply sides) are analyzed. The third 
section is devoted to whether the current economic growth can be sustained, i.e. an 
analysis of the major threats and risks to future growth. The fourth section describes 
the government plans for the next five years and analyzes their potential impact on 
economic growth. Both, the drawbacks of the planned policies and the measures aimed 
at ensuring economic growth sustainability are presented in this section. The final part 
of this paper contains conclusions and policy recommendations. 
2. Determinants of recent economic growth 
2.1. Aggregate demand 
Economic growth accelerated since 2003: in 2003 GDP grew by 7%, in 2004 by 11%. 
Table 1 provides an overview of the main aggregate demand factors for 2002 to 2004. 
Table 1. Contribution of aggregate demand components to GDP growth 
2002 2003 2004 2005 (forecast) 
 Growth 
rate1 
Contribu-
tion2 
Growth 
rate 
Contribu-
tion 
Growth 
rate 
Contribu-
tion 
Growth 
rate 
Contribu-
tion 
Final consumption expenditure3 8.2 6.8 5.7 4.9 10.3 8.7 9.4 7.9 
Households 11.4 7.0 7.4 4.8 13.2 8.7 12.0 8.0 
Gross capital formation 2.4 0.6 27.2 6.6 18.8 5.4 8.7 2.7 
Gross fixed capital formation 6.7 1.6 22.0 5.3 18.9 5.1 14.0 4.1 
Changes in inventories -81.5 -1.0 623.2 1.3 17.0 0.2 -94.4 -1.4 
Net exports of goods and services -5.1 0.2 103.8 -4.4 74.6 -6.0 7.1 0.9 
Exports4 0.1 0.1 9.6 6.1 16.7 10.9 -0.1 0.0 
Imports4 -0.2 0.1 15.5 -10.5 23.1 -16.9 -1.2 0.9 
Statistical discrepancy -- -2.6 -- 0.0 -- 3.0 -- -3.4 
Domestic demand4 6.9 7.4 10.4 11.4 12.5 14.1 9.2 10.5 
Gross domestic product 5.0 5.0 7.0 7.0 11.0 11.0 8.0 8.0 
1 Growth rate in real terms, % yoy. 
2 Contribution to GDP increase, percentage points. 
3 The consumption of the general government and of non-profit institutions serving households is not included because 
of the close-to-zero contribution to GDP growth. 
4 Own estimates. 
Source: Calculations based on the Ministry of Statistics and Analysis data. Forecast – IPM Research Center. 
The main demand factors in 2004 were higher gross exports (10.9 percentage points 
of GDP increase), rising household consumption (8.7 percentage points), and higher 
fixed capital investment (5.1 percentage points). 
(i) Gross exports 
The contribution of net exports was negative in 2003 and 2004. Notwithstanding this 
negative contribution, one should not disregard the positive influence of gross exports 
on growth. Exports grew considerably, thus avoiding a further rise in the negative 
contribution of net exports to growth. For the rise in exports we identify 3 main 
reasons. 
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Firstly, the global economic recovery led to increased commodity demand (oil and 
metals), which in turn caused their prices to increase. As oil and metals are among 
Russia’s main export goods, Russia increased its exports in real and in value terms. This 
increased Russia’s domestic demand, including the demand for Belarusian goods, given 
the existence of a customs union between both countries. As a result, Belarusian 
exports to Russia grew by 13.9% in real terms in 2003 and by 15.1% in 2004. 
Secondly, the external demand came also from non-CIS countries, focusing mainly on 
Belarusian refined oil and ferrous metals products. Belarusian exports to non-CIS 
countries grew by 6.6 and 13.1% in real terms in 2003 and 2004 respectively. 
Thirdly, an additional external determinant of aggregate demand increase was the 
Russian trade policy towards non-CIS producers of milk, meat, and trucks. In 2003, 
Russia increased tariffs on several goods within these groups. This reduced the 
competitiveness of goods made in non-CIS countries compared to Belarusian ones. As 
a result, Belarus’ export of food products and trucks to Russia increased significantly 
(Table 2). 
Table 2. Impact of Russian protectionism on Belarusian exports 
Live animals and animal products Vehicles and aircraft Total exports 
 
2002 2003 2004 2002 2003 2004 2002 2003 2004 
Export, USD m 227.5 348.6 545.3 711.2 795.5 1110.1 8020.9 9945.6 13751.7 
Growth rate, % -8.0 53.2 56.4 -8.2 11.9 39.6 7.7 24.0 38.3 
Source: Own calculations based on Ministry of Statistics and Analysis data. 
(ii) Household consumption 
The largest positive contribution from the domestic demand side came from household 
consumption (Table 1). The household consumption increase was due to rising real 
household incomes caused by wage and pension increases (in 2004, these sources of 
income grew by 17.0 and 17.5% in real terms respectively). There were two main 
determinants for wage growth: an administrative target to reach an average wage of 
USD 250 per month at the end of 2005, and productivity increases. The wage target 
stimulated salary increases in the governmental sector1, while productivity increases 
allowed wage increases in other sectors of the economy. 
(iii) Investment 
Growing domestic and external demand contributed to increased investment activity in 
the country. An additional reason for faster investment growth was the high rate of 
housing construction. Thus, enterprises invested in fixed capital, while households 
invested in housing construction2. As a result, investment in fixed capital and 
construction grew by 22.0% and 18.9% respectively in 2003 and 2004. This resulted in 
about half the domestic demand increase in 2003 and more than one third in 2004. 
In summary, from the demand side economic growth was influenced by the following 
major factors: (1) a very favorable external environment, (2) an expansionary 
governmental income policy, and (3) the current Russian trade policy. 
                                      
1 The government was able to increase salaries because of higher-than-expected state revenues. In 2003 
this was due to additional revenues from foreign trade, in 2004 due to higher than planned revenues 
from the profits tax, VAT, income tax and revenues of several budgetary funds, including the Social 
Security Fund. In turn, sound fiscal stance of the state was supported by the economic upturn: growth of 
exports and imports, profits, incomes, and enterprise revenues. 
2 The increased investment was partly financed by increased loans to the economy. Rising households 
incomes and enterprise revenues led not only to increases in consumption and investment, but also to 
savings growth, which allowed the volume of loans issued by the banking system to be increased. 
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2.2. Aggregate supply 
Although the investment growth was quite fast (about 20% per annum), the 
production capacity (capital stock) increase was relatively low (1.8% in 2003 and 
1.7% in 2004). Fixed assets growth was unevenly distributed among industries, or 
more precisely, among enterprises. Several large enterprises (the Belarusian 
Metallurgical Plant, the Mozyr and Novopolotsk oil refineries3, “Atlant”4, and the sugar 
refineries) substantially increased their production capacities (Table 3), as they faced 
rising demands for their goods. Other enterprises do not have enough resources to 
invest in fixed assets, or their production capacities are still significantly underutilized. 
They respond to increased demand for their goods by increasing their capacity 
utilization (Minsk automobile plant, Minsk tractor plant, Belaruskali, and a number of 
milk and meat producers). 
Table 3. Production capacity utilization for selected industrial products 
Capacity utilization, % Increase of output, 2002–2004 
 
2002 2003 2004 
Change in 
capacity 
utilization* 
Increase of capacity, 
2002–2004, %** % In % of capacity increase 
Oil processing 55.0 53.1 52.8 -2.2 20.2 15.4 41.9 
Steel 91.3 92.5 96.2 4.8 7.6 13.3 159.3 
Accepted cast section 98.9 100.0 100.0 1.1 11.6 12.9 109.4 
Rolled metal (finished) 100.0 97.2 100.0 0.0 13.8 13.8 100.0 
Mineral fertilizers 89.6 97.4 98.7 9.1 3.0 13.4 407.3 
Chemical threads and 
fibers 
65.9 66.3 70.8 4.9 -8.7 -1.9 -- 
Trucks 72.4 80.0 91.4 19.0 1.9 28.6 1081.5 
Tractors 49.2 53.9 68.8 19.6 0.1 39.9 32386.7 
Refrigerators and deep 
freezers (Minsk) 
100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 11.4 11.4 100.0 
Sugar from sugar-beet 100.0 95.0 100.0 0.0 76.9 76.9 100.0 
Milk 49.6 54.5 57.5 8.0 -3.0 12.6 -- 
Meat 41.2 44.8 48.8 7.6 8.1 28.2 142.9 
*   2002–2004, percentage points. 
** Growth rates are calculated as changes in volume of capacity or production. 
Source: Calculations based on the Ministry of Statistics and Analysis data. 
Taking into account the fixed assets growth rate, the increased intensity of work (an 
employee worked 2.1% more in 2003 than in 2002 and 0.6% more in 2004 than in 
2003 on average), and the decreased employment (by 0.9% in 2003 and by 0.1% in 
2004), the labor productivity increased by 4.0% in 2003 and by 8.6% in 2004. But in 
almost all major industries the output increase exceeded the capacity increase (Table 
3). This means that the increase of labor productivity is partly due to higher capacity 
utilization. 
A special role in the output growth in Belarus is played by the Russian energy policy 
towards Belarus. The price of Russian gas for Belarus is lower than it is for European 
and CIS countries. According to IMF estimates, Belarus thus received a “subsidy” of 
7.1% of GDP in 2004 (compared to the gas prices in effect for Germany) and of 1.1% 
of GDP (compared to Ukraine)5. Evidently, this subsidization means lower costs for 
Belarusian enterprises and artificially increases their competitiveness. 
                                      
3 The capacity utilization in the Mozyr refinery at the beginning of 2005 was 72.9%, which is 31.4 
percentage points higher than for the Novopolotsk refinery. Currently both enterprises process 
approximately equal amounts of oil, but the depth of oil processing at Mozyr is 82–84%, which is 10 
percentage points higher than at Novopolotsk. Thus, capacity increases under a quite low utilization is 
due to increasing the depth of oil processing to the level of European refineries (which is 85–87%). 
4 A closed joint-stock company: including the Minsk Refrigerator Plant and the Baranovichi Machine-tool 
Plant. 
5 The first figure was calculated by taking the difference between the border gas prices in Germany and 
Belarus multiplied by the volume of gas supplied to Belarus from Russia; the border gas price in Germany 
was adjusted for the transport cost differential assuming a distance of 1,100 km between the Belarusian 
and German borders closest to Russia, and a transport cost of USD 0.46 per 1000 m3 per 100 km (IMF 
(2005) Republic of Belarus: Selected Issues, IMF Country Report No. 05/217). 
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The competitiveness of Belarusian enterprises on the domestic market also depends to 
a substantial extent on the government’s protectionist measures. Belarusian retail 
trade enterprises are mandated to ensure that a certain part of their assortment of 
goods was produced in Belarus6. Thus, Belarusian enterprises are in a more favorable 
position compared to external competitors. The list of domestic goods was expanded 
in 2004, further restricting the competition on the domestic market. The new, 
expanded list even lists some of the producers of these goods7. 
Thus, the main supply side determinants for output growth in recent years were 
increased capacity utilization, rising investments by major enterprises, and increased 
labor productivity. In addition, the Russian energy subsidies (relatively low gas prices) 
ensured relatively low costs for Belarusian enterprises, while protectionist measures by 
the government provided them with a certain share of the domestic market. 
3. Is the current economic growth sustainable? 
Belarus’ recent economic growth is based (i) on a very favorable external environment 
and on increased utilization of the available production capacities, (ii) on the more or 
less monopolistic position of several Belarusian enterprises relative to certain market 
niches in Russia and/or CEE countries, and (iii) relatively low input prices (such as for 
wages and energy resources)8. Thus, whether this growth is vulnerable depends on 
the sustainability of its current determinants. Taking their nature into account, the 
sustainability of the current growth looks rather uncertain. There are several risks on 
the demand side (decreasing commodity prices, Russian trade policy, and new and 
more efficient competitors) and on the supply side (decreasing Russian energy 
subsidies, income policies, and decreasing investment growth). 
3.1. Demand risks 
(i) Commodity prices 
One major risk on the demand side is the risk of lower commodity prices. Decreasing 
commodity prices can reduce the economic growth rate in Belarus for the following 
reasons. First, it can directly influence Belarusian enterprises. For instance, during the 
first half of 2005 world prices for ferrous metallurgy products decreased, while iron ore 
prices rose9. This reduced the profitability of ferrous metallurgy products and forced 
Belarusian enterprises in this industry to slow output increases. During 2Q05 ferrous 
metallurgy output only increased by 7% yoy, while during 1Q05 it rose by 47.9% yoy. 
Second, lower commodity prices (primarily oil products, potash based fertilizers, and 
metals) mean lower revenues for Belarusian enterprises. In turn, this means slower 
                                      
6 Regulation of the Ministry of Trade No.3 (January 24, 2003). 
7 Regulation of the Ministry of Trade No.44 (October 29, 2004). 
8 The Belarusian economic growth can be characterized as “recovery growth”, i.e. as an economic 
recovery based on the utilization of inputs released by the transition process. There are two reasons for a 
recovery growth: (1) market reforms, privatization and restructuring of old state enterprises and 
emergence of a new private sector, and (2) increased input utilization in the old state sector based on a 
favorable conjuncture and/or on expansionary government policy. In the first case, the country’s internal 
market environment becomes closer to the external one, which makes it easier for domestic enterprises 
to operate on external markets. In the second case, the domestic enterprises operate in a non-market 
framework within the country and in a market environment on the external markets. This implies 
potential problems for the enterprises should the favorable conjuncture disappear. For a detailed 
description of the concept of recovery growth see Gaigar, Y. (2005) Recovery Growth as a Stage of Post-
Socialist Transition? CASE Studies and Analysis No. 292, and Dabrowski, M., Rohozynsky, O., Sinitsina, I. 
(2004) Post-Adaptation Growth Recovery in Poland and Russia – Similarities and Differences. CASE 
Studies and Analysis No. 280. 
9 Based on the favorable price dynamics of 2003–2004, metallurgy companies increased their production 
of metal products, expecting higher demand. But the demand increase has been lower than expected, 
and world prices for metal products went down. At the same time, iron ore prices went up, because of 
the high demand for this input, which was based on the abovementioned expectations. 
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wage growth, reduced state expenditure increases, and lower investment demand (at 
least by the enterprises directly affected by prices decreases). The resulting slower 
domestic demand growth results in a decreased GDP growth rate. An additional 
consequence of commodity price decreases is a slower growth of external demand 
coming from Russia. Thus, lower commodity prices entail a lower external demand 
(and lower exports), and a slow down in domestic demand growth. 
(ii) Russian trade policy and WTO 
Another risk is related to the Russian trade policy. Currently, Belarus benefits from 
trade with Russia because of its customs union with that country. Abolition of this 
arrangement looks unlikely, except that once Russia joins the WTO, it will be required 
to eliminate or reduce certain trade barriers for WTO countries. This would make 
Belarusian goods less competitive on the Russian market. Hence, the Russian WTO 
accession will entail a lower demand for Belarusian goods in Russia and slower export 
growth (perhaps even a reduction of exports). 
(iii) New competitors 
There is also a risk of new competitors arriving on the international markets. The 
dynamics of the major export markets makes them attractive for foreign investors. 
However, attracting foreign direct investment into the biggest export-oriented 
industries of Belarus looks unlikely. Hence, new competitors can readily appear on 
these markets10. This again could mean a reduction of the external demand for 
Belarusian products, i.e. a certain deterioration of Belarusian exports. 
3.2. Supply risks 
(i) Energy prices 
The international competitiveness of most Belarusian enterprises is input-based, i.e. it 
depends on the prices of inputs. Inputs of oil and gas are imported from Russia at 
preferential prices. Thus, the competitiveness of Belarusian products is greatly 
influenced by the existence of these energy “subsidies”. 
This situation entails the risk of decreasing the competitiveness of Belarusian goods 
should the Russian subsidies ever be reduced or eliminated. Russia plans to join the 
WTO in 2005–2006, and after its accession it will rise the gas prices it charges to CIS 
countries, including Belarus. This increase of the Russian energy prices will increase 
production costs, which threatens the profitability of many Belarusian enterprises, 
especially their competitiveness on external markets. Raising the gas price for Belarus 
to the level of the border gas price for Germany would increase the costs in the 
economy by 6–7% of GDP, while the total net profit within the economy in 2004 
amounted to 9.1% of GDP. Such a reduction of profits will mean less investment 
activity and slowing output increases. 
(ii) Income policy 
Another important limitation for economic growth in Belarus is the current income 
policy of the government. The government has set several monthly wage targets: 
USD 100 by September 2001 (presidential elections), USD 250 by the end of 2005 
(Program of Social and Economic Development for 2001–2005), and USD 500–540 by 
the end of 2010 (Program of Social and Economic Development for 2006–2010). 
However, labor productivity grew much slower. According to IMF estimates, labor 
                                      
10 Several examples of Belarusian enterprises loosing competitiveness vis-à-vis Russian or other foreign 
enterprises took place between 1998 and 2001, when Belarus lost markets for some food products (e.g. 
beer and packaged food products) and some light industry products (footwear and most clothing). These 
industries are quite small, and the government has been able to save for some of them a part of the 
domestic market through protectionist measures. 
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productivity rose only by one half to two-thirds of the wage increases between 1996 
and 2004. Further wage increases would increase the cost of labor and decrease 
(potential) profits, thus reducing competitiveness and the investment potential. 
The government increased salaries within the state sector, too. This entails a 
redistribution of state expenditures (for instance, from investment to infrastructure) 
and maintenance of the high current level of taxation. Evidently, high taxes reduce 
the incentives to invest in businesses within the country. 
Thus, the current income policy of the government, though having a positive impact on 
consumer demand, can restrict the supply due to higher labor costs and lower 
investment. 
(iii) Investment policy 
An additional supply-side risk is the current investment policy of the government. At 
present, domestic resources are the main source of investment in Belarus. In recent 
years the main source for domestic investment was bank loans. 
But the Belarusian financial sector is quite narrow (the monetization coefficient11 was 
16.7% at the end of 2004). It is also broadening more slowly than investment. Thus, 
domestic resources will be insufficient to increase investment over the long run. 
Figure 1. Investment potential of Belarus and its utilization 
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Note. The data presents the place of Belarus among 140 countries of the world. 
Source: UNCTAD (2004). 
According to UNCTAD data, Belarus has a substantial potential for foreign investment. 
For 2000 to 2002 it was 56th among 140 countries. The inward FDI Potential Index is 
only slightly lower than that of Lithuania (52nd place), Latvia (49th), and Slovakia 
(47th), and substantially higher than that of Kazakhstan (78th) and Ukraine (94th). 
Nevertheless, Belarus uses only about 60% of its investment potential (Figure 1), i.e. 
the actual inflow of foreign direct investment is substantially lower than the potential 
inflow. Belarus’ actual FDI performance ranks much worse (104th place). At the same 
time, Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine (in 47th, 46th, and 89th place, respectively) attract 
FDI in accordance with their potential, while Slovakia and Kazakhstan (in 8th and 12th 
place) attract much more foreign investment than would be expected based on the 
FDI Potential Index. 
Thus, the rather fast investment growth in recent years was based only on limited 
domestic resources and a slowdown can be expected unless the government changes 
                                      
11 Ratio of broad money supply (M3) to GDP. 
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its attitude towards foreign investment. Under-investment is a serious risk to the 
sustainability of economic growth in Belarus. 
To summarize Part 3: We can conclude that the sustainability of economic growth in 
Belarus depends on exogenous and endogenous risks. The exogenous risks include a 
decrease in commodities prices, changes to the Russian trade policy (especially in 
light of Russia’s WTO accession), and the decrease or elimination of Russian energy 
subsidies to Belarus. Belarus cannot influence on these risks directly, and their 
realization will cause a slow down of GDP growth. But the government could 
implement policies to reduce the negative effects of the exogenous risks. The 
endogenous risks include the government’s income policy and the rigidity of its policy 
towards privatization and restructuring. Belarus could avoid these risks if it changed 
these policies from growth retarding to growth enhancing. 
4. How to ensure sustainable economic growth in Belarus 
4.1. Government plans 
The Government has prepared a “Concept of the Program for Socio-Economic 
Development of the Republic of Belarus for 2006–2010” (hereafter: Concept 2006-
2010), which proposes certain measures to ensure the planned GDP growth. We will 
only present those measures, which are related to the endogenous risks for 
sustainable growth discussed above. 
(i) Income policy 
The main improvement compared to the current situation is the plan to decrease the 
gap between labor productivity and real wage growth. For 2006–2010 the planned 
annual real wage growth is 9.2–10.1%, while the annual labor productivity growth is 
planned at 7.9–9.2%. Thus, the gap between these two indicators is expected not 
exceed 2.1 percentage points per year compared to the annual gap for 2001–2005 of 
approx. 6.9 percentage points12. Evidently, this is a significant improvement of the 
income policy, which will reduce the burden of labor costs for enterprises. 
(ii) Investment policy 
According to Concept 2006–2010, the main investment source will be domestic 
resources: internal company resources, and household and bank loans. The main 
problem with this is the limited amount of domestic capital available in Belarus and, 
hence, the limited financing possibilities for the country. 
The government also plans on significant investments by the state. One of the largest 
government investment programs is the State Program for Revival and Development 
of the Village. It envisages about USD 12 bn of government investment in the 
agricultural sector between 2005 and 2010 (Table 4). 
Table 4. Expenditures of the State Program 
for Revival and Development of the Village 
BYR bn 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2005-2010 
Total expenditures 10118.4 10543.7 11143.9 11581.5 12348.7 14082.9 69819.1 
of which: state expenditures 3974.0 3968.9 4298.8 4633.4 5000.8 5394.1 27270.0 
Note.  State expenditures include the innovation funds. Assuming 2% devaluation between 2006 and 2010, the total 
amount of expenditures will be about USD 30 bn, including about USD 12 bn in state expenditures. 
Source: State Program for Revival and Development of the Village for 2005–2010. 
State investment in such spheres as agriculture is less desirable than private 
investment for two reasons. First, the government should invest in sectors with ‘market 
                                      
12 The actual labor productivity growth matched the forecast of the Program for Socio-Economic 
Development for 2001–2005, while the actual real wage growth was higher by approx. 2.2% per annum. 
But despite the risk of higher than planned real wage growth without a matching increase in labor 
productivity, the 2006–2010 program is far more balanced in this respect than the 2001–2005 program. 
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failures’ (e.g. education or infrastructure), where private investments are not enough to 
provide the required level of performance. Scarce fiscal resources must be distributed in 
the most efficient way. Second, higher state expenditures mean higher taxes, which 
reduces the investment incentives for taxpayers. Government investment in one 
specific sector reduces the investment activity in the whole economy. Thus, it is best to 
choose public investment projects carefully, and improve the investment activities in 
order to reduce the tax burden. 
Finally, a change in the government’s attitude towards privatization is not to be 
expected. In the Program for Socio-Economic Development of the Republic of Belarus 
for 2006–2010 the government declared that each case of creating a foreign or joint 
venture from a state enterprise should be considered individually. The government de-
facto bans foreign investors from buying a controlling interest. Also, the very tight 
‘golden share’ institute puts an obstacle in the way of fresh capital inflows into “old” 
enterprises. Thus, all major problems and risks of the bad investment climate continue. 
In sum, the government plans to take some positive steps to ensure the sustainability 
of economic growth. Nevertheless, certain complementary measures are needed, as 
several risks for growth sustainability are not eliminated by the planned policies. 
4.2. Complementary policies 
(i) Investment climate 
Two major institutional obstacles to a better investment climate go hand in hand: they 
are the de-facto ban on buying the controlling stock of Belarusian companies by 
foreign investors and the ‘golden share’ institute. Any foreign investor should be able 
to pursue his own policies (of course within legal bounds) without running the risk of 
governmental interference. He should also be subject to standardized and transparent 
privatization procedures, because an individual approach to privatization is non-
transparent and contains risks for investors. Thus, in order to improve the investment 
climate, we propose the following: 
1) To draw up a limited list of enterprises not subject to privatization, and to allow 
foreign investors to buy the controlling stock of any company not on this list; 
2) To soften the ‘golden share’ institute, i.e. to limit the number of cases to which it 
applies to a clearly and unambiguously defined list, or to eliminate this institution. 
Improving the investment climate would allow Belarus to use its good investment 
potential, and to improve technologies and competitiveness. It would also reduce the 
risks inherent in energy price increases and the Russian trade policy, since Belarusian 
enterprises with foreign investment would have a better chance to increase their 
efficiencies and enter new markets. Some foreign companies might then even decide 
to invest in Belarusian companies rather than compete with them. 
(ii) SME development 
Another very important growth enhancing policy is SME development. It is needed to 
better utilize the resources released in the transition process and is one of the 
components of ‘recovery growth’. The role of SME development is not fully realized in 
Belarus because the current favorable external environment allows the old state 
enterprises to increase their capacity utilization. Also, the country has a poor 
environment for SME development. According to the ‘Ease of Doing Business’ indicator 
(calculated by the World Bank), Belarus is the last among 25 transition economies 
(Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. Ease of doing business in CIS transition economies 
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Note. CEB (Central Europe and Baltic States) countries are the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. 
Source: Own calculations based on World Bank data (World Bank (2004) Doing Business in 2005). 
The World Bank estimates that moving a country out of the group of 20% of countries 
with the biggest obstacles to doing business into the group of 20% with the most 
favorable business environment would give it an additional 2.2 percentage points of 
annual GDP growth. As Belarus is in the 20% group with most difficulties, any easing 
of doing business in the country would have a significant positive impact on economic 
growth. According to World Bank estimates, entry reform alone, i.e. reducing the 
time, the cost, and the number of procedures to register a business, would bring 
Belarus an additional 0.34% of annual GDP growth. In addition, promoting SME 
development would smooth the effects of negative external shocks and ease the 
restructuring of former state enterprises. 
Thus, implementing these proposed complementary measures (improving the business 
climate and making it easier to do business) would contribute to the government’s 
growth enhancing policies and further growth sustainability. 
5. Conclusions and policy recommendations 
Any economy sometimes faces a favorable and sometimes an unfavorable 
environment. During 2003 to 2005 the external environment was very favorable for 
Belarus, and economic growth accelerated. 
Thus, Belarus should use the current good times to safeguard itself from likely 
downturns in the future. This could be done by investing and increasing the capital 
stock, and by improving the competitiveness of Belarusian enterprises. To do this, the 
government should create the right incentives for businesses, including foreign ones. 
In addition to measures already envisaged by the government, we propose to improve 
the investment climate by moving forward with privatization and making it 
transparent, by making it easier to do business in Belarus, and by promoting SME 
development. Only in that way can the current short-term economic growth be 
transformed into long-term sustainable growth, which will increase the welfare of the 
Belarusian people. 
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